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Abstract
We study a prototypical new-Keynesian model in which agents are averse to
ambiguity, and where the ambiguity regards the monetary policy rule. We show
that ambiguity has important effects even in steady state, as uncertainty about the
policymaker’s response function affects the rest of the model via the consumption-
saving decision. A reduction in ambiguity - e.g. due to credible monetary policy
actions and communications - results in a fall in inflation and the policy rate, and
an increase in welfare. Moreover while, absent ambiguity, the policymaker’s actual
responsiveness to inflation does not matter as long as the Taylor principle is satisfied,
in the face of ambiguity the exact degree to which the central bank responds to
inflation regains importance. Indeed, a high degree of responsiveness to inflation
mitigates the welfare costs of ambiguity. We also present various results regarding
the optimal choice of an inflation target, both when ambiguity is given and when
assuming the policymaker can affect ambiguity with increased transparency and
communications.
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1 Introduction
Communication and transparency have become more important for central banks
in recent decades. Since the demise of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent Great
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Recession, central banks have adopted a range of unconventional monetary policy
measures: great emphasis has also been put on enhanced communication, aimed
at clarifying the policymakers’ reaction function1. As with all policy actions, it
is crucial to have models that can help us understand how improved central bank
communications affect the economy. Addressing this question however is possible
only in a model that relaxes the commonly held assumption that all the laws of
motion of the variables in the economy are perfectly known by the agents.
In this paper we study a prototypical new-Keynesian model in which agents are
averse to ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, and where the ambiguity regards
the monetary policy rule. Ambiguity describes a situation in which there is uncer-
tainty about the probability distribution over contingent states of the world. In our
model, ambiguity does not affect a purely exogenous process like total factor pro-
ductivity, as in recent work by Ilut and Schneider (2014), but rather the perceived
response function of the central bank. Effectively, we model the ambiguity as a
further component of the monetary policy rule that can take values in a range the
agents entertain as possible, but to which they cannot assign probabilities, and we
investigate how this affects the design of monetary policy2.
When agents are averse to ambiguity, they will make their decisions as if the
worst-case scenario were to materialise. Therefore the first step of our analysis
must be to characterise the worst-case steady state. We first analyse a model in
which a subsidy to factor inputs is aimed at offsetting the distortions arising from
monopolistic competition. In this model, and in absence of ambiguity, the central
bank can implement a monetary policy that delivers the first-best allocation. We
show that the agents’ welfare is locally concave with respect to ambiguity so that
only the two extreme values in the range of uncertainty considered by agents are
candidate minima. We also show that, in the first-best model, the worst-case steady
state is, for any level of ambiguity, the one in which agents act as if the interest rate
were lower than that implied by rational expectations. This results in a “too high”
demand for consumption on the part of the agents, which generates an increase in
the marginal costs firms face, in inflation and consequently in the interest rate set
by the central bank. In the absence of indexation, as inflation deviates from its
first-best value, price dispersion (Yun, 2005) arises. Price dispersion is a key driver
of the loss of welfare that characterises the steady state under ambiguity.
Ambiguity, therefore, has important effects even in steady state. First, in a
world with lower ambiguity - i.e. where the range of models agents consider possible
but to which they cannot assign probabilities is smaller - inflation and the policy
rate will be lower, and welfare will be higher, than a world with higher ambiguity
about the monetary policy rule. Indeed, clearer and more transparent central bank
communications since the 1990s plausibly reduced ambiguity about monetary policy
and could, in principle, be a concurrent explanation for the Great Moderation.
Figures 1 and 2 report, for the US and the UK respectively, inflation and the policy
1Yellen (March 2013) of the Federal Reserve, Bean (August 2013) of the Bank of England and Draghi
(April 2014) of the European Central Bank have all described the guidance they had given as “clarifying
the reaction function.”
2Unlike Benigno and Paciello (2014), who study how the presence of doubts and ambiguity about
the economic environment influences the characterisation of optimal monetary policy, we focus on the
uncertainty about the policymaker’s reaction function.
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Figure 1: US: Annual inflation and the Fed Funds rate from the end of the Bretton Woods
system (1971) to September 2014. The shaded areas indicate NBER recessions, while the black
vertical lines indicate the dates of the main changes in the communication of the Federal Reserve
Board
rate from the the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 3 to 2014. In both charts
the black vertical line indicates the first change in the communication of the central
bank aimed at reducing the uncertainty about the behaviour of the policymakers:
namely, the first post-meeting FOMC statement in the case of the Federal Reserve
and the introduction of an inflation target in the case of the Bank of England. Both
charts are suggestive of some break in the behaviour of inflation and the interest
rate around the time of the increase in transparency. This observation is supported
for example by work done by Levin and Piger (2004), who investigate the time
series properties of inflation in industrialised economies and find strong evidence of
a structural break at the beginning of the 1990s. This evidence suggests that indeed
periods of lower transparency - and thus higher ambiguity about monetary policy -
are associated with higher inflation and higher interest rates.
We also look at a version of our model in which there is no subsidy offsetting
the distortions arising from monopolistic competition, and where consequently no
monetary policy can achieve the first-best allocation. Also in this case the agents’
welfare is locally concave with respect to ambiguity, and only the two extreme values
in the range of uncertainty considered by agents are candidate minima. However
the worst-case scenario can be the low-inflation or the high-inflation one, depending
on the level of ambiguity. When the ambiguity is very low, the worst-case scenario
will be the low-inflation one; it will be the high-inflation one otherwise.
We then study how the design of monetary policy is affected by the presence
of ambiguity. First, we find that, in the presence of ambiguity, the degree of re-
sponsiveness to inflation of the central bank regains a role in determining welfare.
3Or the earliest available data for the UK
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Figure 2: UK: Two measures of inflation and Bank Rate from 1975 to September 2014. The
black vertical lines indicate the dates of the main changes in the communication of the Bank of
England
As shown for example in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Ascari and Ropele
(2007), in models like the one we consider but with no ambiguity the policymaker’s
degree of responsiveness to inflation plays virtually no role in determining welfare,
provided that the Taylor Principle is satisfied4. In our framework, instead, there
is an interplay between the amount of ambiguity, the degree of responsiveness to
inflation and welfare. In particular, in a world with low ambiguity about monetary
policy the costs associated with a lower responsiveness to inflation are smaller than
in a world with high ambiguity. We also study if and how the policymaker should
set an inflation target in order to maximise welfare for a given level of ambiguity.
In a model in which a subsidy to factor inputs offsets the distortions arising from
monopolistic competition, steady-state inflation is always higher than in the first-
best case. We show that, for a given level of ambiguity, it is welfare enhancing for
the central bank to implement an inflation target. The target reduces the relative
price distortion associated with the price dispersion introduced by ambiguity and
this naturally enhances welfare5. This is true also for a model in which the distor-
tion arising from monopolistic competition cannot be offset, though with a different
value of the optimal target.
We then analyse the case in which the policymaker can affect ambiguity about
monetary policy rather than simply taking it as given. This seems like a natural
thought experiment given the massive increases in transparency about policymaking
that happened in the last decades, as well as the more and more explicit commu-
4In models as simple as the one we use for our analysis, the degree of responsiveness to inflation would
be entirely irrelevant, if the Taylor principle is satisfied, because a TFP shock would not generate any
inflation irrespective of the degree of responsiveness.
5This is in line with Yun’s (2005) result for a model with no ambiguity but with price dispersion.
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nications of the last years. Since ambiguity is welfare reducing, the best strategy
would be for the policymakers to completely dispel ambiguity - though it seems
rather unrealistic that they might succeed in removing ambiguity completely, as
there might be lingering credibility issues, or simply the inability to pin down the
exact dynamics of committee decision-making. In the first best-model, this would
be enough to bring the model back to the first-best steady state. For the second-
best model, Ascari and Ropele (2007) show that, even when ambiguity is zero, there
is an incentive for the policymaker to introduce an inflation target. However the
target could be counter-productive from a welfare perspective, if the uncertainty
is not dispelled. Our qualitative results suggest that the introduction of the infla-
tion target is beneficial only if ambiguity about monetary policy is very close to
zero, while it becomes damaging above a certain threshold of uncertainty. This is
in line with evidence on the minor effectiveness of inflation targeting in emerging
market economies, due to the lack of credible institutions (for a recent review of the
evidence see Brito and Bystedt, 2010).
We conclude our analysis studying the transitional dynamics from a high-ambiguity
steady state to a low-ambiguity steady state. Consumption increases, while the in-
terest rate and inflation fall. Price dispersion subsides, as a result of the fact that
optimally set prices are closer to the prevailing average price, which follows from
the lower level of inflation. Therefore welfare increases and the output gap closes.
A lower level of ambiguity, makes agents better off, so in the new steady state they
want to consume more goods and enjoy more leisure as well. Price stickiness, how-
ever, causes the price dispersion to fall falls quite slowly, which hinders productivity.
As a result hours actually jump up on impact before starting to slowly converge to
the new, lower, steady state. A combination of high hours and high consumption,
together with sticky prices, drive real wages temporarily above their new steady
state level.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the model.
In Section 3 we characterise the worst case with respect to which the agents make
their decisions and present simple comparative statics results that cast light on
the workings of the distortion determined by the presence of ambiguity, while sec-
tion 4 investigate the design of monetary policy under ambiguity. In section 5 we
summarise the results about transitional dynamics from a steady state with high
ambiguity to one with low ambiguity and we report our conclusions in section 6.
2 The Model
We modify a textbook New-Keynesian model (Gal´ı, 2008) by assuming that the
agents suffer ambiguity about the expected future policy rate. Absent ambiguity,
the first-best allocation is attained thanks to a sufficiently strong response of the
Central Bank to inflation, i.e. for φ > 1 and to a Government subsidy that corrects
the distortion introduced by monopolistic competition.
2.1 Households
Let st ∈ S be the vector of exogenous states. We use s
t = (s1, ..., st) to denote the
history of the states up to date t. A consumption plan
−→
C says, for every history st,
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how many units of the final good Ct(s
t) a household consumes and for how many
hours Nt(s
t) a household works. The consumer’s felicity function is:
u(
−→
C t) = log(Ct)−
N1+σt
1 + σ
Utility conditional on history st equals felicity from the current consumption and
labour mix plus discounted expected continuation utility, i.e. the households’ utility
is defined recursively as
Ut(
−→
C ; st) = u(
−→
C t) + β min
p∈Pt(st)
E
pUt+1(
−→
C ; st, st+1) (1)
where Pt(s
t) is a set of conditional probabilities about next period’s state st+1 ∈ S.
The recursive formulation ensures that preferences are dynamically consistent. The
multiple priors functional form (1) allows modeling agents that have a set of multiple
beliefs and also captures a strict preference for knowing probabilities (or an aversion
to not knowing the probabilities of outcomes), as discussed in Ilut and Schneider
(2014)6. A non-degenerate belief set Pt(s
t) means that agents are not confident
in probability assessments, while the standard rational expectations model can be
obtained as a special case of this framework in which the belief set contains only
one belief.
As discussed in more detail below, we parametrise the belief set with an interval
[−µt, µt] of means centered around zero, so we can think of a loss of confidence as an
increase in the width of that interval. That is, a wider interval at history st describes
an agent who is less confident, perhaps because he has only poor information about
what will happen at t+ 1. The preferences above then take the form:
Ut(
−→
C ; st) = u(
−→
C t) + β min
µ∈[−µt, µt]
E
µUt+1(
−→
C ; st, st+1) (2)
The households’ budget constraint is:
PtCt +Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 +WtNt + Tt (3)
where Tt includes government transfers as well as a profits, Wt is the hourly wage,
Pt is the price of the final good and Bt are bonds with a one-period nominal return
Rt. There is no heterogeneity across households, because they all earn the same
wage in the competitive labor market, they own a diversified portfolio of firms, they
consume the same Dixit-Stiglitz consumption bundle and face the same ambiguity.
The only peculiarity of households in this setup is their perceived uncertainty about
the return to their savings Rt. As we describe in more detail in the Subsection 2.3,
Rt is formally set by the Central Bank after the consumption decision is made, while
the agents make their decisions based on their perceived interest rate R˜t, which is
a function of the ambiguity µ. The Central Bank sets Rt based on current inflation
and the current level of the natural rate, so absent ambiguity, the private sector
would know its exact value and it would correspond to the usual risk-free rate. In
this context, however, agents do not fully trust the Central Bank’s response function
and so they will consider a range of interest rates indexed by µ.
6More details and axiomatic foundations for such preferences are in Epstein and Schneider (2003).
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The household’s intertemporal and intratemporal Euler equation simply read:
1
Ct
= Eµt
[
βRt
Ct+1Πt+1
]
(4)
Nσt Ct =
Wt
Pt
(5)
While they both look absolutely standard the expectation for the intertemporal
Euler equation reflects agents’ ambiguous beliefs.
In particular, we restrict ambiguity to the policy rate as follows:
E
µ
t
[
βRt
Ct+1Πt+1
]
≡ Et
[
βR˜t
Ct+1Πt+1
]
Hence the intertemporal Euler equation becomes:
1
Ct
= Et
[
βR˜t
Ct+1Πt+1
]
(6)
where R˜t ≡ Rte
µt and Et is the rational-expectations operator.
2.2 Firms
The final good Yt is produced by final good producers who operate in a perfectly
competitive environment using a continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i) and the
standard CES production function
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
ε−1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
. (7)
Taking prices as given, the final good producers choose intermediate good quantities
Yt(i) to maximize profits, resulting in the usual Dixit-Stiglitz demand function for
the intermediate goods
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Yt (8)
and in the aggregate price index
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−εdi
] 1
1−ε
.
Intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms with the following linear technology:
Yt(i) = AtNt(i), (9)
where At is a stationary technology process
7. Prices are sticky in the sense of Calvo
(1983): only a random fraction of firms (1 − θ) can re-optimise their price at any
7We have also considered a version of the model which included capital in the production function
and an investment decision and our qualitative results follow through.
7
given period, while the others must keep the nominal price unchanged. Whenever a
firm can re-optimise, it sets its price maximising the expected presented discounted
value of future profits
max
P ∗t
Et
[
∞∑
s=0
θsQt+s
((
P ∗t
Pt+s
)1−ǫ
Yt+s −Ψ
((
P ∗t
Pt+s
)−ǫ
Yt+s
))]
(10)
where Qt+s is the stochastic discount factor, Yt+s denotes aggregate output in period
t+ s and Ψ(·) is the net cost function. Given the simple linear production function
in one input the (real) cost function simply takes the form Ψ (Yt(i)) = (1−τ)
Wt
Pt
Yt(i)
At
,
where τ is the production subsidy.
The firm’s price-setting decision in characterised by the following first-order
condition:
P ∗t (i)
Pt
=
Et
∑
∞
j=0 θ
jQt+s
(
Pt+j
Pt
)ǫ
ǫ
ǫ−1MCt+j
Et
∑
∞
j=0 θ
jQt+s
(
Pt+j
Pt
)ǫ−1 ,
which ultimately pins down inflation, together with the following equation derived
from the law of motion for the price index:
P ∗t (i)
Pt
=
(
1− θΠǫ−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ǫ
. (11)
This setup results in a purely forward looking log-linear Phillips Curve, since
firms do not index to past inflation8. We will consider both the case in which
the production subsidy successfully offsets the distortions arising from monopolistic
competition and the case in which there is no subsidy, i.e. τ = 0. In the former case,
absent ambiguity, the Central Bank’s Taylor rule attains the first-best allocation,
while in the latter case the first-best cannot be attained. The presence of the
subsidy has implications for the determination of the worst case scenario, which
will be discussed in detail in Section 3.1.
2.3 The Government and the Central Bank
The Government runs a balanced budget and, if τ 6= 0 finances the production
subsidy with a lump-sum tax. Out of notational convenience, we include the firms’
profits and the deadweight loss resulting from price dispersion ∆t, which is defined
in the next section, in the lump-sum transfer:
Tt = Pt
(
−τ
Wt
Pt
Nt + Yt
(
1− (1− τ)
Wt∆t
PtAt
))
= PtYt
(
1−
Wt∆t
PtAt
)
.
The first expression explicitly shows that we include in Tt the financing of the
subsidy, the second refers to the economy-wide profits, which include the price-
dispersion term ∆t, formally defined in the following Subsection
8As also mentioned above, we assume zero inflation in the first-best steady state, but it would simple
to re-write the whole problem under the assumption of positive first-best steady state inflation; all results
would carry through provided that the firms indexed to that level of inflation.
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The Central Bank follows a very simple Taylor rule:
Rt = R
n
t (Πt)
φ , (12)
here Rt is the gross nominal interest rate paid on bonds maturing at time t+1 and
Rnt = Et
At+1
βAt
is the gross natural interest rate9. For simplicity of exposition we have
assumed an inflation target of zero, however all our results would through with any
inflation target, provided that the firms indexed at that same value of the target.
The Central Bank formally sets rates after the private sector makes their eco-
nomic decisions, but it does so based on variables such as the current natural rate
and current inflation, which are known to the private sector as well. There are no
monetary policy shocks, nor the Central Bank is trying to take advantage of this
timing as in the inflation bias literature. Therefore if the private sector were to fully
trust the Central Bank, i.e. under the standard modeling assumption µt = 0 then
clearly:
R˜t ≡ Rte
µt = Rt = R
n
t (Πt)
φ
which is the nominal rate that implements first-best allocations (together with the
subsidy). And, clearly, there is no uncertainty in the standard sense of the word
around the expected value, which is then a risk-free rate.
In the context of our analysis, however, agents suffer ambiguity about the poli-
cymaker’s response function (µt 6= 0) and dislike such ambiguity, so they will base
their decision on the interest-rate level that, within the range they entertain pos-
sible, would hurt their welfare the most if it was to prevail. In this case, even in
the presence of the production subsidy, we cannot achieve the first-best allocation,
despite the Central Bank following a Taylor rule (12) that would normally imple-
ment it, because the private sector will use a somewhat different interest rate for
their consumption-saving decision. In this stylized setup, we thus capture a situa-
tion in which, despite the policymakers actions, the first-best allocation fails to be
attained because of a lack of confidence and/or understanding on the part of the
private sector, which sets the stage for studying the benefits resulting from making
the private sector more aware and confident about the implementation of monetary
policy.
2.4 Market clearing conditions
Market clearing in the goods markets requires that
Yt(i) = Ct(i)
for all firms i ∈ [0, 1] and all t. Given aggregate output Yt is defined as in equation
(7), then it follows that
Yt = Ct.
9While there is an expectation in the definition of the natural rate, under rational expectations the
expectations of the Central Bank will coincide with those of the private sector, hence the natural rate
will be known by both sides and there will be no uncertainty about it.
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Market clearing on the labour market implies that
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di.
=
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
At
di
=
Yt
At
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
di
where we obtain the second equality substituting in the production function (9)
and then use the demand function (8) to obtain the last equality. Let us define
∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫ
di as the variable that measures the relative price dispersion
across intermediate firms. ∆t represents the inefficiency loss due to relative price
dispersion under the Calvo mechanism: the higher ∆t, the more labor is needed to
produce a given level of output.
3 Steady state analysis
Following Ilut and Schneider (2014), we study our model economy log-linearized
around the worst-case steady state, because ambiguity-averse agents will make their
decisions as if that were the steady state. Therefore, we must first identify the
worst-case scenario and characterise it. We derive the steady state of the agents’
first-order conditions as a function of a generic constant level of µ and we rank the
different steady states (indexed by the level of distortion induced by the ambiguity)
to characterize the worst-case steady state.
3.1 General Properties of the Steady States
3.1.1 Inflation and the Policy Rate
All steady states, albeit distorted, are characterised by a constant consumption
stream. As a result, the intertemporal Euler equation pins down the perceived
real interest rate, i.e. the rate that determines the intertemporal substitution of
consumption. Combining this with our simple Taylor rule then delivers the steady
state level of inflation consistent with the distortion and the constant consumption
stream, as the following result states.
Result 3.1. In a steady state with no real growth, inflation depends on the ambiguity
distortion parameter as follows:
Π(µ, ·) = e−
µ
φ−1 , (13)
while the policy rate is:
R(µ, ·) =
1
β
e
−
φµ
φ−1 . (14)
Hence, φ > 1 implies that for any µ > 0:
Π(µ, ·) < Π(0, ·) = 1 R(µ, ·) < R(0, ·) =
1
β
, (15)
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and the opposite for µ < 0.
Proof. Proof in Appendix A.
Result 3.1 clearly shows that inflation is a decreasing function of µ as long as
φ > 1. The mapping from µ to Π(µ, ·) implies that the steady state of the model
and it’s associated welfare, can be equivalently characterised in terms of inflation
or in terms of µ.
To build some intuition on the steady state formula for inflation and the interest
rate, let us consider the case in which household decisions are based on a level of the
interest rate that is systematically lower than the true policy rate (µ < 0)10. Other
things equal, this will induce too a high a demand pressure, causing an increase in
inflation. In the end, higher inflation will be matched by higher nominal interest
rate so that constant consumption in steady state is attained. The result of this is
that the policy rate will end up being higher than in the first-best steady state11 ( 1
β
).
3.1.2 Pricing
In our model firms index their prices based on the first-best inflation, which is zero in
this case. Because of ambiguity, steady-state inflation will not be zero and therefore
there will be price dispersion in steady state:
∆(µ, ·) =
(1− θ)
(
1−θΠ(µ,·)ǫ−1
1−θ
) ǫ
ǫ−1
1− θΠ(µ, ·)ǫ
(16)
∆ is minimised for Πss = 1 - or, equivalently, µ = 0 - and is larger than unity
for any other value of µ. As in Yun (2005), the presence of price dispersion alters
the behaviour of the monetary policymaker in sticky price models with staggered
price-setting. Price dispersion reduces labour productivity and ultimately welfare.
3.1.3 Hours, Consumption and Welfare
In a steady state with no real growth12, steady-state hours are the following function
of µ:
N(µ, ·) =
((
1− θΠ(µ, ·)ǫ−1
)
(1− βθΠ(µ, ·)ǫ)
(1− βθΠ(µ, ·)ǫ−1) (1− θΠ(µ, ·)ǫ)
) 1
1+ψ
, (17)
while consumption is:
C(µ, ·) =
A
∆(µ, ·)
N(µ, ·) (18)
10In our analysis we do not consider the zero lower bound, because in case it was binding that could
not be be a steady state. If one wanted to explicitly account for that, a restriction on range of µ would
simply take the following form: µ < −φ−1
φ
log (β).
11Here we assume that, absent distortions, inflation would be zero in steady state, but, as discussed
previously, all results follow through with non-zero steady state inflation, as long as the firms index to
that value of inflation.
12We expect the results to follow through for a model with a stochastic trend in technology, as long as
the variables are appropriately detrended.
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Hence the steady state welfare function takes a very simple form:
V(µ, ·) =
1
1− β
(
log (C(µ, ·))−
N(µ, ·)1+ψ
1 + ψ
)
. (19)
3.2 Calibration
In many instances, we will try to provide general results that do not depend on the
specific parameter values. However, to illustrate our points we will make frequent
use of charts, so we discuss the model calibration in this Subsection, while also
noting that the model is intended for a more qualitative analysis rather than sharp
quantitative predictions.
We calibrate β = .995 to deliver a 2 percent annual steady-state interest rate.
ψ = 1 implies a unitary Frisch elasticity of the labor supply, which is within the
commonly accepted range. We assign value .83 to the fraction of firms θ that cannot
re-optimise in each period: this corresponds to an average price duration of about
one and half years. While this is towards the high end of the accepted range, since
this is the only friction in the model at the moment, a high value helps us get
a richer dynamics in Section 5. We set the elasticity of goods’ demand ǫ to 11,
which implies a ten percent markup, and set the inflation response coefficient in the
Taylor rule to φ = 2. We choose this value for the baseline calibration, because,
in log-linear terms, it makes inflation vary one for one with the distortion while
being within commonly accepted ranges. Finally, for what concerns the parameter
governing ambiguity, µ, we will consider values up to .01. Translating this into
annual interest rates, that implies uncertainty around the policy rate of the order
of ±4 percent, larger than one could reasonably consider. We consider this value
primarily to illustrate the robustness of our local analytical results.
3.3 Properties of the Welfare Function and Worst-Case
Steady State
So far we have considered the optimal behaviour of consumers and firms for a given
µ, i.e. a given misperception of the expected policy rate. To pin down the worst-
case scenario we need to consider how the agents’ welfare is affected by different
values of µ and find the µ that minimises the their welfare.
Ilut and Schneider (2014) assume that agents are ambiguous about the exogenous
TFP process. It follows quite naturally that the worst-case steady state is one in
which agents under-estimate TFP growth. In our case, however, two differences
arise:
I. Given that the interest rate is set optimally, any under- or overprediction will
generate a welfare loss. Hence, it is not a priori clear what the worst case
might be.
II. Because the policy rate responds to the endogenously determined inflation
rate, distortions in expectations have a feedback effect via their impact on the
steady state level of inflation.
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Figure 3: Steady-state welfare as a function of µ in the model with the production subsidy.
We now proceed by first studying the model with the production subsidy and
then the case in which the there is no subsidy, i.e. τ = 0.
3.3.1 The first-best model
In the our simple model with the production subsidy, monetary policy implements
the first-best allocation, so it is clear that any µ 6= 0 will generate a welfare loss.
However, it is not a priori clear if a negative µ is worse than a positive one of the
same magnitude.
The following result rules out the presence of interior minima for sufficiently
small ambiguity ranges, given the weakest restrictions on parameter values implied
by economic theory.
Result 3.2. For β ∈ [0, 1), ǫ ∈ (1,∞), θ ∈ [0, 1), φ ∈ (1,∞), ψ ∈ [0,∞), V(µ, ·)
is continuously differentiable around µ = 0 and:
∂V(0, ·)
∂µ
= 0 and
∂2V(0, ·)
∂µ2
< 0
As a consequence, for small enough µ, there are no minima in µ ∈ (−µ, µ).
Proof. Proof in Appendix A.
Result 3.2 illustrates that the welfare function is locally concave around the first-
best (see Figure 3, drawn under our baseline calibration described above). Realistic
calibrations show that the range of µ for which the value function is concave is in
practice much larger than any plausible range for the ambiguity.
While this is hardly surprising, given that our economy attains the first best in
the absence of ambiguity, it is worth stressing that Result 3.2 depends on the pro-
duction subsidy that undoes the price markup in steady state. Absent the subsidy
∂V(0,·)
∂µ
|τ=0 < 0, a situation we address in the next Subsection.
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Figure 4: Steady state marginal cost as a function of µ.
Result 3.2 rules out interior minima, but it remains to be seen which of the
two extremes is worse from a welfare perspective. Graphically and numerically
it is immediate to see from Figure 3 that the welfare function is concave but not
symmetric with respect to µ. More generally, it is possible to establish this sufficient
condition for the characterisation of the worst-case scenario.
Result 3.3. For β sufficiently close but below 1 and all the other parameters in
the intervals defined in Result 3.2, µ = −µ minimizes V(µ, ·) over [−µ, µ], for any
sufficiently small µ > 0.
Proof. Proof in Appendix A.
In practice, this sufficient condition is not at all restrictive because any sensible
calibration would set β to a value that is well within the range for which our result
holds.
The intuition for the asymmetry of the welfare function is the following. While
the effect of µ on inflation is symmetric (in logs) around zero, the impact of inflation
on welfare is not. In particular, positive steady-state inflation - associated with
negative levels of µ as shown in Result 3.1 - leads to a bigger welfare loss than a
corresponding level of negative inflation. This results from the fact that positive
inflation tends to lower the relative price of firms who do not get a chance to re-
optimise. These firms will face a very high demand, which in turn will push up
their labour demand, and ultimately their marginal costs, due to the convexity of
the marginal cost function with respect to µ, as Figure 4 shows. On the other hand,
negative inflation will reduce the demand for firms which do not re-optimise and
this will reduce their demand for labour and their marginal costs13. In the limit, as
the relative price goes to zero, firms will incur huge marginal costs while as their
relative price goes to infinity their demand goes to zero.
13As this is the first best model, when there is no ambiguity, i.e. where the MC function crosses the
y-axis, the marginal cost is equal to the inverse of the mark-up.
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Figure 5: Steady State policy rate Rt (solid line) and interest rate expected by ambiguity-
averse agents R˜t (dashed line) as a function of µ.
Having characterised the worst-case steady state, we can now use Result 3.1 to
directly infer that, in an ambiguity-ridden economy, inflation will be higher than
in the first-best allocation and so will be the policy rate, as evident from Figure 5.
Figure 5 illustrates the wedge between the actual and the perceived policy rates as
a function of µ. When agents base their decisions on a perceived interest rate R˜t
that is lower than the actual policy rate, the under-estimation of the policy rate
tends to push up consumption and generate inflationary pressures, which, in turn,
lead to an increase in the policy rate (the afore mentioned feedback effect).
The combined effects of higher inflation, higher policy rates and negative µ make
the perceived real rate of interest equal to 1
β
, which is necessary to deliver a constant
consumption stream, i.e. a steady state. The level of this constant consumption
stream (and ultimately welfare) depends, in turn, on the price dispersion generated
by the level of inflation that characterises the steady state.
The following Result summarises Results 3.1 and 3.3 and establishes more for-
mally the effects of ambiguity on the worst-case steady state levels of inflation and
the policy rate. In particular, we study the effect of a permanent unforseen reduction
in the range over which agents are ambiguous.
Result 3.4. For β sufficiently close but below one and all the other parameters in
the intervals defined in Result 3.2, for any small enough µ > 0:
Vw(µ
′) > Vw(µ) Πw(µ
′) < Πw(µ) Rw(µ
′) < Rw(µ) ∀ 0 ≤ µ
′ < µ (20)
where the w subscript refers to welfare-minimizing steady state value of each variable
over the interval [−µ, µ].
Proof. Proof in Appendix A.
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Figure 6: On the left pane, the first-best welfare function (red) and that in the absence
of the subsidy (blue). On the right pane a detail of the welfare function without subsidy
around zero.
3.3.2 The second-best model
So far, we have focused on an economy that, in the absence of ambiguity, will
attain the first-best allocation. Removing the subsidy implies that, even if there is
no ambiguity, the first-best allocation is not achievable, because distortions arising
from monopolistic competition are not offset. This experiment casts light on what
can happen when a richer set of frictions are added to the model.
As shown in the left panel of Figure 6, the welfare function of our calibrated
model14 shifts down and to the left, when we remove the subsidy ( τ = 0). The
right hand panel of Figure 6 zooms into the welfare function for the model with no
subsidy to show that welfare actually does not have a maximum in zero, but slightly
shifted too the left. We can interpret the downward shift as a general efficiency loss,
while the movement to the left - i.e. the fact that the welfare function’s maximum
is achieved for a negative value of µ) and a positive value of inflation - follows from
the fact that a moderate positive inflation reduces the monopoly power of firms and
enhances welfare, as also highlighted Ascari and Ropele (2009) among others, in
models with rational expectations. Both movements are detrimental, the first for
completely obvious reasons, the second because clearly the set of worst-case steady
states over symmetric intervals around zero is bounded by V(0) < V(µSB), where
µSB refers to the level of µ that would achieve the second best allocation. In other
words, even absent ambiguity the second-best cannot be achieved.
Notice that, when there is no subsidy, the first derivative of the welfare function
evaluated at zero ambiguity is negative,V′NT (0) < 0. This means that for low levels
of ambiguity the worst-case steady state will correspond to µ = µ, i.e. worst-case
inflation will be inefficiently low. For higher levels of µ, however, welfare drops faster
for higher levels of inflation than it does for levels of inflation below the first-best
14These results seem absolutely robust to the specifics of the calibration.
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Figure 7: Annualized worst-case steady state inflation as a function of µ in a model with
production subsidy (red line) and a model without subsidy (blue).
benchmark, just as in the case with the subsidy: in that case the worst case reverts
to being the one in which µ = −µ and inflation is “too high”. In other words, in the
absence of the subsidy, the worst-case steady state inflation can be both too high
or too low, depending on the prevailing degree of ambiguity. Figure (7) graphically
illustrates the point by showing the worst-case steady-state level of inflation as a
function of µ both in the presence and the absence of the subsidy.
At this stage, our model is too stylised to make sharp quantitative conclusions,
however we can make two general points. First, it is entirely possible that discon-
tinuities in the worst-case steady states for the model variables arise as µ varies.
Second, the effects of policy interventions might interact with ambiguity in a non-
trivial way. Building on this, in the next Section we study the design of monetary
policy in the presence of ambiguity.
4 Monetary Policy Design
In this section we analyse the design of monetary policy under ambiguity. We first
study the case in which the policymaker takes the level of ambiguity about policy
as given, while in the second subsection we consider the case in which the Central
Bank can reduce ambiguity through transparency and better communication of its
intentions and strategy.
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4.1 For a given level of ambiguity µ
The presence of ambiguity in the model affects the characteristics of policy quite
substantially with respect to the case in which there is no ambiguity. Crucially, the
inflation response coefficient regains an important role in determining welfare, as we
show in what follows. Moreover, if a policymaker is aware of the ambiguity, he/she
can also choose an inflation target to minimise its effect. We will present the results
below for the model in which the production subsidy is present, and will point out
if and when the results are different when the subsidy is absent.
4.1.1 The role of the inflation response coefficient φ
In the model with the production subsidy and no ambiguity, any inflation response
coefficient φ larger than one would deliver the first-best allocation (see Gal´ı, 2008),
both in steady state and, absent unwarranted monetary policy shocks, even period
by period15. As a result, from a welfare perspective any value of φ > 1 would
be equivalent. Once ambiguity enters the picture, however, things change and the
responsiveness of the Central Bank to inflation interacts with ambiguity in an eco-
nomically interesting way.
First, it is possible to view a reduction in ambiguity and the responsiveness to
inflation as substitutes in terms of welfare, which can be formalized as follows.
Result 4.1. While parameter values are in the intervals defined in Result 3.2 and
µ is a small positive number, given any pair (µ, φ) ∈ [−µ, 0) × (1,∞), for any
µ′ ∈ [−µ, 0) there exists φ′ ∈ (1, ∞) such that:
V(µ, φ′) = V(µ′, φ) (21)
And φ′ ≥ φ iff µ′ ≥ µ.
A corresponding equivalence holds for µ ∈ (0, µ].
Proof. Proof in Appendix A.
This result illustrates how the presence of ambiguity brings the inflation re-
sponsiveness coefficient to centre stage. The intuition behind this relation between
responsiveness to inflation and ambiguity is the following. What matters for agents
is the steady state level of inflation: if ambiguity is taken as given, the only way
of getting close to its first-best value is for the central bank to respond much more
strongly to deviations of inflation from its first-best level. A higher value of φ works
as an insurance that the response to inflation will be aggressive, which acts against
the effect of ambiguity about policy. At the same time, as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007) suggest, it is practically not very sensible to consider very high values for φ,
for instance because of the possibility that a modest cost-push shock would cause
the policy rate to hit the Zero Lower Bound. So a very high value for φ is ultimately
not a solution.
Figure (8) illustrates Result 4.1 graphically for our preferred calibration. Basi-
cally, a higher responsiveness of the Central Bank to inflation flattens the welfare
function with respect to µ, thus reducing the loss induced by ambiguity. As a result,
15Limited to the fact in this economy the only other shock is a technology shock.
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Figure 8: Welfare function for φ = 2 (solid red line) and φ = 2.5 (orange dashed line).
it is possible to find different combinations of ambiguity and inflation responsiveness
which are welfare equivalent. We can also show that the impact of different values of
φ is smaller for lower values of ambiguity, as the gap between the welfare functions
of two economies, identical except for the value of φ, vanishes as µ approaches zero.
4.1.2 A different Taylor rule
In this section we investigate what a Central Bank can do if it takes the level of
ambiguity about policy as given - and cannot or will not set φ to infinity. The first-
best allocation is not attainable under these circumstances, but the policymaker
can still intervene to improve welfare.
To begin our discussion, it is important to note that the first-best welfare can
be achieved if and only if:
i. µFB ∈ [−µ, µ]
ii. V (µ, ·) = V (µFB, ·) ∀ µ ∈ [−µ, µ].
Let us express the first derivative of the welfare function as:
∂V(µ, ·)
∂µ
=
∂V(µ, ·)
∂Π(µ, ·)
∂Π(µ, ·)
∂µ
. (22)
We can think of ∂V(µ,·)
∂Π(µ,·) as depending on the structure of the economy - for example,
the degree of indexation, the existence of subsidies, the degree of price stickiness -
and therefore being beyond the reach of monetary policy action. The policymaker
can control the second component of the right-hand side of equation (22), ∂Π(µ,·)
∂µ
,
by either shrinking the range over which µ can vary or by increasing φ. That is
because the choice of µ pertains to private sector, the Central Bank can only induce
the private sector to make the best choice.
Note that our baseline case meets both conditions when µ = 0, i.e. there is no
ambiguity. The conditions are met even for positive µ in the limiting case in which
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φ→∞, as it makes ∂Π(µ,·)
∂µ
→ 016. So achieving the first-best allocation would only
be possible if the welfare function was made completely flat over [−µ, µ]. Any finite
value of φ would prevent the Central Bank from implementing it. This said, there
is something policymakers can do to improve of the welfare level V(−µ, ·) which
would prevail in this economy.
In very general terms, we consider an extra term in our Taylor rule that could
possibly depend on some endogenous variables and can capture the idea that, if
policymakers are faced with households that constantly underestimate the interest
rate they set, they might naturally consider responding responding to the agents’
distorted beliefs by increasing the interest rate they set above the level implied by
the inflation level.
Rt = R
n
t Π
φ
t e
δ(·) (23)
It would be tempting to say that policymakers should use δ to increase the policy
rate by the same amount by which the agents underestimate the policy rate. The
intuition is not completely unwarranted, as Result 4.2 shows, but misses the fact
that such policy action would change the worst-case scenario and would not be the
most successful strategy.
Before getting to the determination of the optimal value for δ(·), following the
same logic as for Result 3.1, it is easy to show that this modification will only change
the steady state level of inflation, which becomes:
Π(µ, δ(·), ·) = e
−
µ+δ(·)
φ−1 (24)
The rest of the model equations are unaffected and the changes in welfare come from
the fact at a certain level of µ corresponds a different inflation level. In particular,
what determines inflation, and ultimately welfare, is the sum of µ and δ, hence it
is very easy to characterise the welfare function for this economy (using a subscript
δ):
Vδ(µ, ·) = V(µ+ δ(·), ·) ∀ µ ∈ [−µ, µ]. (25)
Graphically, δ shifts the welfare function horizontally.
The optimal level of δ(·) as a function of the level of ambiguity µ can then be
easily computed numerically based on the following general characterization.
Result 4.2. Assuming that V(µ, ·) takes only real values over some interval (−a, a),
is continuous, strictly concave and attains a finite maximum at µ = µ0 ∈ (−a, a);
if φ is fixed and µ > 0, then the optimal level of δ is pinned down by the following
condition.
δ∗(µ) : V (−µ+ δ∗(µ), ·) = V (µ+ δ∗(µ), ·) (26)
Moreover, in the context of the economy described in Section 2, it is the case that:
0 < δ∗(µ) < µ. (27)
16Another situation in which the conditions are met even for positive levels of ambiguity is indexation,
as it makes ∂V(µ,·)
∂Π(µ,·) = 0.
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Proof. Proof in Appendix A.
Intuitively, this result illustrates how the δ(·) should be used to shift the welfare
function sideways, to the point in which the worst case would move to the other
extreme of the interval. In our economy, this implies charging a higher interest rate
than warranted by inflation and the natural rate, supporting the intuitive claim
made above. At the same time though, if one was to mechanically increase rates by
the amount agents underestimate them (which would correspond to setting δ = µ),
that would induce the worst-case scenario to be one in which agents overestimate
rates, thus making the correction miss its point. That is why the optimal level of δ
is strictly positive and yet smaller than the amount by which agents underestimate
the policy rate in the original model.
4.2 When the policymaker can affect µ
We now consider a situation in which the monetary policy maker is able to reduce
the ambiguity about monetary policy by increasing transparency and improving
communications. If it were possible, the policymaker should reduce the ambiguity
to zero. In that case the agents’ belief set would collapse to only one, rational,
belief.
In the case of the model with the production subsidy, completely removing ambi-
guity would allow the attainment of the first-best allocation. In the model without
the production subsidy, when there is no ambiguity the Central Bank should imple-
ment an inflation target, aiming to achieve the second-best steady state allocation
- i.e. the highest level of steady-state welfare achievable in the model economy
without the subsidy. It is easy to show that the following modification of the Taylor
rule:
Rt = R
n
t
(
Πt
Π∗
)φ
Π∗ ≡ e
−
µSB
φ µSB : V
′(µSB) = 0
will ensure that V∗
′(0) = 0, i.e. that the welfare function of the economy without
the subsidy but with the inflation target17 will achieve its maximum at µ = 0.
As Figure 9 shows, the inflation target causes a shift to the right of the welfare
function. By removing ambiguity and setting the inflation target to the level defined
above, the Central Bank would achieve the best possible steady state in the absence
of the production subsidy.
This well known policy-design strategy is proven to work, when ambiguity is
completely removed. If high level of ambiguity persist after the implementation of
the target, it might be possible that the inflation target defined above might be
counterproductive18.
17A star subscript will denote the welfare function when there is an inflation target but no subsidy.
18This is not to say that any inflation target would be counterproductive, but simply that the optimal
inflation target should reflect the degree of ambiguity in the economy, i.e. the inflation target that would
be optimal in the absence of uncertainty might not be so when ambiguity is accounted for (see Result
4.2 for an illustration of this point).
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Figure 9: Welfare function for the second-best model with no inflation target in blue and
with the optimal inflation target in green.
When the optimal inflation target is implemented, the worst-case will always
correspond to high inflation, yet inflation will be higher than in the first-best, as
Figure (11) shows. On the one hand, we know that in this class of models, higher
inflation will drive up price dispersion reducing welfare. At the same time, though,
in the absence of a production subsidy, it is well known that a moderate level of
positive inflation reduces the adverse welfare effects of monopolistic competition,
i.e. effectively reduces the markup. The target defined above exploits the benefit of
moderate positive inflation to the fullest.
When ambiguity is too high, however, a target designed to work in an ambiguity-
free economy might end up being counterproductive as Figure (10) shows. The basic
intuitive reason is that the premise under which it is computed is that inflation would
be zero in the absence of the target, while we know that inflation will not be zero
under ambiguity. This does not mean that an inflation target could not be devised
for an ambiguity-ridden economy, as the analysis in Section 4.1.2 suggests. Rather,
it suggests that, ideally a Central Bank will want to reduce ambiguity as much as
possible and if that proves not feasible that should be accounted for when setting
an optimal target.
5 Transitional Dynamics - a primer
Given a steady state we can log-linearize around it in the usual way. As explained
in Ascari and Ropele (2007), having price dispersion in steady state essentially
results in an extra term in the Phillips Curve. Appendix B presents the log-linear
approximation around a generic steady state indexed by µ, simply setting µ = −µ
one obtains the log-linear approximation to the worst-case steady state.
For a moment, let us consider the case in which ambiguity is constant and the
only shock hitting the economy is a standard TFP shock. The fact that the Central
Bank tracks the natural rate of interest makes the dynamic solution extremely simple
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Figure 10: Difference in the worst-case welfare between the case in which an inflation
target is implemented and that in which is not for different values µ. In formulas:
minµ∈[−µ,µ]V∗(µ, ·)−minµ∈[−µ,µ]VNT (µ, ·)
in that only consumption/output would respond one for one to a TFP shock, while
all other variables are constant. This is true for any given level of ambiguity. An
immediate consequence is that while welfare would increase with a positive TFP
shock, the output gap would be constant at at its steady state level which depends on
the degree of inefficiently high inflation in the economy. In other words the response
of the central bank would be optimal in a dynamic sense but would not get the
economy closer to first-best. Moreover, it is essential to note that the determinacy
region of the solution described above would shrink with the degree of ambiguity.
As Ascari and Ropele (2009), Kiley (2007) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)
have documented, non-zero trend inflation has important effects on the determinacy
region. In particular, other things equal, it tends to drive up the level of inflation
responsiveness φ that guarantees determinacy to a value larger than unity. This
has interesting implications in our setting, because trend inflation in turn depends
on φ. In other words, a low level of φ generates, for a given level of ambiguity, a
higher level of trend inflation, which in turn requires a higher φ to keep the model
economy in the determinacy region. So, once more, ambiguity makes the Central
Bank’s responsiveness to inflation all the more crucial.
If we then consider the transmission of other shocks, a key parameter to un-
derstand the economy’s response is the coefficient on marginal costs in the Phillips
Curve, sometimes referred to as the slope of the Phillips Curve. The presence of
ambiguity changes the Phillips Curve in our model in two ways: first, there will be
an extra term relative to the standard textbook case due to price dispersion, and,
second, the slope of the curve falls with higher levels of worst-case steady state infla-
tion. Hence, the Central Bank’s attitude towards inflation φ will, in the context of
our model, also impact the transmission of shocks via the responsiveness of inflation
to the marginal cost or the output gap.
Up to this point we have restricted our analysis to a constant level of ambiguity.
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Figure 11: Annualized worst-case steady state inflation as a function of µ. Model with
production subsidy in red, without neither subsidy nor inflation target in blue and without
subsidy but with inflation target in green.
We now consider a transition between two levels of ambiguity, i.e. a situation in
which µ is permanently and unexpectedly reduced from .00125 to 0. This amounts
to reducing the ambiguity around the annualized policy rate from ±50 to ±0 basis
points. Studying a permanent unexpected shift is desirable in at least a couple of
ways. First, it dispenses from making an ad hoc assumption on a known process for
the evolution for ambiguity. Second, it captures the spirit of a policy announcement
that changes the agents’ level of confidence permanently. Otherwise we would end
up capturing the fact that agents make their consumption decision fully aware that
the economy would eventually drift back to the initial level of ambiguity.
To study the transitional dynamics, we log-linearize the economy around µ =
−.00125 and initialize at the old steady state values (in percent deviations from
the new). Figure 12 presents the responses for some of the variables of the model.
It shows how consumption, which equals output, increases while the interest rate
and inflation fall. Along the way welfare increases and the output gap closes. On
the pricing side, price dispersion subsides, as a result of the fact that optimally set
prices are closer to the prevailing average price (which follows from the lower level of
inflation). The dynamics of hours is a bit more striking. A lower level of ambiguity,
makes agents better off, so in the new steady state they want to consume more
goods, and enjoy more leisure. Price stickiness, however, generates the dynamics
depicted in Figure 12. Demand for consumption jumps up very quickly, while ∆t, as
a result of the Calvo friction, falls quite slowly. This hinders labor productivity and,
as a result, hours actually jump up on impact before starting to slowly converge to
the new steady state. A combination of high hours and high consumption, together
with sticky prices, drive real wages temporarily above their new steady state level.
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Notice that in the new equilibrium ambiguity is zero, so the policy rate r and the
rate on the basis of which the agents take their decision r˜ coincide.
Clearly the transition is quite fast and the changes numerically small, since the
model has a minimum amount of frictions and the change in ambiguity is relatively
small too. However at this point we are not trying to provide a quantitative assess-
ment of the effects of this permanent unforeseen reduction in ambiguity but rather
to build our intuition.
6 Conclusions
We study a prototypical new-Keynesian model in which agents are averse to am-
biguity, or Knightian uncertainty, and where the ambiguity regards the monetary
policy rule. Ambiguity is welfare reducing, but in our framework the policymaker
can dampen its impact, if he or she can credibly implement policy actions and com-
munications that reduce such ambiguity. Effectively, we model the ambiguity as a
further component of the monetary policy rule that can take values in a range the
agents entertain as possible, but to which they cannot assign probabilities, and we
investigate the role for policy actions that can credibly reduce this range.
Already when doing comparative statics with this model, interesting results
emerge. First, a reduction in the parameter governing steady state ambiguity -
i.e. a tightening of the range of models agents consider possible but to which they
cannot assign probabilities - results in a fall in inflation and the policy rate, and
an increase in welfare. Indeed, clearer and more transparent Central Bank commu-
nications since the 1980s plausibly reduced ambiguity about monetary policy and
could, in principle, be a concurrent explanation for the Great Moderation. Second,
the policymaker’s responsiveness to inflation regains centre stage. In particular, if
the Central Bank is very responsive to inflation, it will dampen the negative effects
of welfare brought about by ambiguity. Similarly, the welfare benefits of a reduction
in ambiguity also depend of the degree of responsiveness to inflation of the Central
Bank: with lower ambiguity, the costs associated with a lower responsiveness to
inflation are also reduced. Third, the introduction of an inflation target can be ben-
eficial, but the optimal value of the target crucially depends on the existing amount
of ambiguity. So, if the Central Bank misjudges the degree of ambiguity about his
behaviour, or if it does not have enough credibility, then it could be that an inflation
target is welfare-reducing. Our qualitative results suggest that the introduction of
the inflation target is beneficial only if there is a limited amount of uncertainty
about the implemented policy action, while it becomes damaging above a certain
threshold of uncertainty. This is in line with evidence on the minor effectiveness
of inflation targeting in emerging market economies, due to the lack of credible
institutions.
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Figure 12: Responses of the policy rate, the interest rate perceived by the agents and
inflation (top row), output/consumption, price dispersion, consumption and hours (middle
row), real wages, the output gap and labor productivity (bottom row) to a permanent
and unexpected reduction in ambiguity, in the model with production subsidy.
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A Proofs
Proof of Result 3.1
In steady state, equation 6 becomes:
1 =
βR˜ (µ, ·)
Π (µ, ·)
(28)
From the Taylor rule we get:
R˜ (µ, ·) = Rn (µ, ·) Π (µ, ·)φ eµ =
1
β
Π(µ, ·)φ eµ (29)
Combining the two, delivers the first part of the result.
The second follows immediately by plugging the resulting expression for inflation
into the Taylor rule.
The inequalities result by noting that φ > 1.
Proof of Result 3.2
V (µ, ·), as defined in equation 19, is continuously differentiable around zero. Direct
computation, or noting that the first-best allocation is attained in our model when
µ = 0, shows that ∂V(µ,·)
∂µ
= 0.
Direct computation also delivers:
∂2V (µ, ·)
∂µ2
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= −
θ
(
(β − 1)2θ + ǫ(βθ − 1)2(1 + ψ)
)
(1− β)(θ − 1)2(βθ − 1)2(φ− 1)2(1 + ψ)
(30)
All the terms are positive given the minimal theoretical restrictions we impose,
hence the second derivative is strictly negative and there are no interior minima in
a neighbourhood of zero.
Proof of Result 3.3
Direct computation shows that the third derivative evaluated at µ = 0 can be
expressed as:
∂3V (µ, ·)
∂µ3
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
=
ǫ(2ǫ− 1)θ(1 + θ)
(1− β)(1 − θ)3(φ− 1)3
+R(β) (31)
Where, given our parameter restrictions, the first term on the RHS is positve and
R(β) is a term in β such that limβ→1−R(β) = 0.
Hence, limβ→1−
∂3V(µ,·)
∂µ3
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= +∞.
Moreover, ∂
(
∂3V(µ,·)
∂µ3
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
)
/∂β exists, which ensures continuity of the third deriva-
tive in β. Hence the third derivative is positive for any β sufficiently close to but
below unity.
A third-order Taylor expansion around zero can be used to show that:
V (µ0, ·) − V (−µ0, ·) =
∂3V (µ, ·)
∂µ3
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
2µ30
6
+ o(µ40), (32)
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which is positive for a generic, positive but small value µ0 thus showing that, the
steady state value function attains a lower value at −µ0 than it does at at µ0. This,
combined with the absence of internal minima (Result 3.2), delivers our result.
Proof of Result 3.4
The first inequality follows immediately, as a weak inequality, by considering that
Vw(µ
′) is the minimum value of welfare on a smaller set thanVw(µ).
The strict inequality follows from the characterization of the worst case in Results 3.2
and 3.3; in particular from the fact that Vw(µ) = V (−µ, ·) and that
∂V(µ,·)
∂µ
∣∣∣
µ<0
> 0
in the vicinity of µ = 0.
For what concerns inflation, given the formula in Result 3.1, φ > 1 and given that
the worst case corresponds to µ = −µ, it is immediate to verify that µ
φ−1 >
µ′
φ−1 .
φ > 1 also ensures that the Taylor rule is increasing in inflation more than one for
one, which delivers the last inequality.
Proof of Result 4.1
Inspection reveals that µ and φ only enter steady-state welfare through the steady-
state inflation term Π(µ, ·) = e
µ
1−φ . It follows immediately that, for a given µ′,
φ′ = 1 + (φ−1)µ
µ′
implies that (µ, φ′) is welfare equivalent to (µ′, φ). (µ, µ′) ∈
[−µ, 0) × [−µ, 0) ensures that µ′ · µ > 0 and so φ′ ∈ (1,∞) for any φ > 1. The
inequalities follow immediately from the definition of φ′ given above and the fact
that both µ and µ′ have the same sign.
A similar argument would go through for (µ, µ′) ∈ (0, µ]× (0, µ].
Proof of Result 4.2
First we define µ0 to be the value that maximizes V (µ, ·). Strict concavity ensures
it is unique.
A number of different cases then arise:
1. µ0 ∈ (−µ, µ): then V
′(−µ, ·) > 0 > V′(µ, ·)19
a. V(−µ, ·) < V(µ, ·). Together with strict concavity this implies that µws =
−µ. Then there exists a small enough δ > 0 such that
V(−µ, ·) < V(−µ+ δ, ·) < V(µ+ δ, ·) < V(µ, ·)
. So now the worst case µ′ws = −µ+ δ generates a higher level of welfare.
The worst-case welfare can be improved until the second inequality above
holds with equality. Continuity ensures such a level of δ∗ exists. Any
value of δ > δ∗ will, however, make welfare in the worst case decrease,
and the second inequality above would reverse the sign.
19With an abuse of notation we use derivatives here but we do not need differentiability. We just need
the function to be strictly increasing and strictly decreasing for values of µ respectively smaller and larger
than µ0, which is ensured by strict concavity.
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b. V(−µ, ·) > V(µ, ·). Together with strict concavity, this implies that µws =
µ. Then there exists a small enough δ < 0 delivering the same as above
c. V(−µ, ·) = V(µ, ·). There is no room for improvement. Any δ 6= 0 would
lower the worst-case welfare.
2. µ0 ≥ µ. Strict concavity implies that V (−µ, ·) < V (µ, ·). Hence µws = −µ.
For all 0 ≤ δ ≤ µ0 − µ
V(−µ, ·) < V(−µ+ δ, ·) < V(µ+ δ, ·) ≤ V(µ0, ·)
For δ just above µ0 − µ we fall in case 1a above.
3. µ0 ≤ −µ. Strict concavity implies that V (−µ, ·) > V (µ, ·). Hence µws = µ.
For all µ0 − µ ≤ δ ≤ 0
V(µ0, ·) ≥ V(−µ+ δ, ·) > V(µ+ δ, ·) > V(µ, ·)
For δ just above µ0 − µ we fall in case 1b above.
To prove the second part, note that in our baseline economy the welfare function
is continuous and strictly concave in the vicinity of zero and attains a maximum at
µ0 = 0. Since 0 ∈ (−µ, µ) for all strictly positive µ, then we are in case 1a. This
proves that δ∗(µ) > 0. Suppose now that δ∗(µ) ≥ µ. That would push the argmax
of the welfare function outside (or on the boundary) of [−µ, µ], which can never be
optimal given strict concavity (similar arguments to cases 2 and 3 above).
B Log-Linearized Equations
The following equation describe the dynamics of the variables of interest around the
worst-case steady state:
ct = Etct+1 − (r˜t − Etπt+1) (33)
wt = ct + ψnt (34)
πt = κ0 (µ, ·)mct + κ1 (µ, ·)EtF̂2t+1 + κ2 (µ, ·)Etπt+1 (35)
rt = r
n
t + φπt (36)
r˜t = rt + µt (37)
mct = wt − at (38)
yt = at − ∆˜t + nt (39)
ct = yt (40)
∆ˆt = Π(µ, ·)
ǫθ∆ˆt−1 + ǫ
Π(µ, ·)ǫθ − (1−Π(µ, ·)ǫθ) θ(
1
Π(µ,·)
)ǫ−1
− θ
πt(41)
F̂2t = (ǫ− 1)βθΠ(µ, ·)
ǫ−1
Etπt+1 + βθΠ(µ, ·)
ǫ−1
EtF̂2t+1 (42)
Where κ0 (µ, ·) ≡
((
1
Π(µ,·)
)ǫ−1
−θ
)
(1−βθΠ(µ,·)ǫ)
θ
, κ1 (µ, ·) ≡ β
((
1
Π(µ,·)
)ǫ−1
− θ
)
(Π (µ, ·)− 1)Π (µ, ·)ǫ−1
and κ2 (µ, ·) ≡, κ2 (µ, ·) ≡ βΠ(µ, ·)
ǫ−1
(
θ(ǫ− 1)(Π (µ, ·)− 1) + (ǫ(1−Π(µ, ·)− 1))
(
1
Π(µ,·)
)ǫ−1)
.
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